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Abstract 
 
Government-issued longevity bonds would allow longevity risk to be shared 
efficiently and fairly between generations. In exchange for paying a longevity risk 
premium, the current generation of retirees can look to future generations to hedge 
their aggregate longevity risk. There are also wider social benefits. Longevity bonds 
will lead to a more secure pension savings market - both defined contribution and 
defined benefit - together with a more efficient annuity market resulting in less 
means-tested benefits and a higher tax take. The emerging capital market in 
longevity-linked instruments can get help to kick start market participation through 
the establishment of reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity 
risk term structure and can build on this term structure with liquid longevity 
derivatives. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Longevity Bonds pay declining coupons linked to the survivorship of a cohort of the 
population, say 65-year-old males; for example, the coupon payable at age 75 (i.e., 10 
years after the issue date of the bond) will depend on the proportion of 65-year-old 
males who survive to age 75; they have no principal repayment. They are designed to 
hedge aggregate longevity risk. 
 
Insurance companies and pension plan providers face the risk that retirees might on 
average live longer than expected.  Longevity risk is a substantial risk that might 
adversely affect both the willingness and ability of financial institutions to supply 
retired households with financial products to manage wealth decumulation in 
retirement.  In this paper, we explain how Governments issuing Longevity Bonds can 
act as a catalyst to facilitate the transfer of a proportion of this risk to the capital 
markets.  We highlight the benefits that would flow from a transparent and liquid 
capital market in longevity risk, and we argue that there is an important role for 
Governments to play in helping this emerging market to grow.  We also show how the 
Government might consider pricing Longevity Bonds in the face of potential demand 
from defined benefit and defined contribution plans and from annuity providers. Our 
line of reasoning comes from working in the UK, but we believe that what we argue 
here has validity for all countries with mature funded pension systems.  
 
The UK pension fund industry is the second largest in the world by value, with assets 
of around 20% of those held in the USA. However, the UK lifetime annuity market is 
much larger than in the US – around 500,000 annuities are set up each year at a cost 
of £12bn, mainly as a result of the effective requirement to buy life annuities as part 
of DC (defined contribution) pension plan provision. Watson Wyatt predicts the UK 
at-retirement market for financial products such as annuities will grow by around 60% 
over the next 5 years.1  
 
A well-functioning annuity market will become increasingly important as DC plans 
mature, not just in the UK, but in all countries where DC pension provision becomes 
the norm. The importance of DC pensions and, in turn, lifetime annuities is growing 
rapidly as Governments cut social security pensions and companies move away from 
DB (defined benefit) plans. DC plans have to work effectively if people are going to 
be prepared to save privately for their pensions.  However, a growing weakness in DC 
plans is the inability of annuity providers to hedge the aggregate longevity risk they 
face. Aggregate longevity risk might affect the price and availability of annuities, as 
well as insurance company solvency. Every country with DC pension plans will 
sooner or later have to confront the problem of dealing with aggregate longevity risk 
 
We therefore believe that the time is right for the UK and other Governments to set up 
a working party to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the Government issuance of 
Longevity Bonds.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Watson Wyatt Press Release July 2009 
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II. What is longevity risk? 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of longevity risk
Total longevity risk 
= 
Aggregate longevity risk
[Trend risk]
+
Specific longevity risk
[Random variation risk]
Government
needs to 
provide hedge
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Figure 1 shows that longevity risk is driven by two underlying risks: random variation 
risk and trend risk. Random variation risk is the risk that individual mortality rates 
differ from the outcome expected as a result of chance – some people will die before 
their life expectancy, some will die after.2 Trend risk is the risk that unanticipated 
changes in life-style behaviour or medical advances significantly improve longevity.3  
 
Private-sector institutions can deal with a ‘specific risk’ like random variation risk by 
pooling and relying on the law of large numbers to reduce the variability of this risk. 
Trend risk, on the other hand, is, like inflation risk, an ‘aggregate risk’ that cannot be 
diversified away by pooling and, indeed, the more business an insurer pools, the 
bigger the relative impact of trend risk. The private sector is unable to hedge this risk 
effectively without a suitable hedging instrument. We will argue that there is a key 
                                                 
2 The mortality rate for a given age measures the frequency of occurrence of deaths of people of the 
given age in a defined population during a specified time interval, typically one year. Mortality rates 
are derived from crude death rates which are calculated as the ratio of deaths to the exposed population, 
i.e., the number of lives at the start of the period exposed to the risk of dying during a specified time 
interval, typically one year. A survivor (or survival) rate for a given age measures the proportion of 
people of the given age surviving a specified time interval. The survivor rate at age 65 equals (1 – 
mortality rate at age 65). Life expectancy measures the average number of years a person of a given 
age would live under a given set of mortality conditions. Life expectancy is usually computed on the 
basis of a life table showing the probability of dying at each age for a given population according to the 
age-specific death rates prevailing during a specified period. For example, life expectancy at 65 = 0.5 + 
(1-q65) + (1-q65)*(1-q66) + (1-q65)*(1-q66)*(1-q67) + ...+ (1-q65)* ... *(1-q120) and q120 is 
typically set to unity and q65 is the mortality rate at age 65 etc. We also need to distinguish between 
period life expectancy which makes no allowance for future improvements in mortality rates – and so 
assumes, for example, that q67 in the above formula will equal the mortality rate of today’s 67-year-
olds – and cohort life expectancy which makes such an allowance – and hence will involve a lower q67 
than used to calculate period life expectancy.  
3 Factors such as obesity and environmental degradation could eventually lead to a trend decline in life 
expectancy.    
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role for Governments to help the private sector by issuing Longevity Bonds –  
particularly by issuing bonds that provide ‘tail risk’ protection against trend risk – and 
by helping with the construction of national longevity indices.  
 
 
III. Why should we be concerned about longevity risk and who bears it?   
 
Longevity risk is borne by every institution making payments that depend on how 
long individuals are going to live. These include DB pension plan sponsors, insurance 
companies selling life annuities and Governments through the social security pension 
system and the final salary pension plans for public-sector employees. The situation is 
particularly acute for insurance companies operating in the European Union (EU) 
where a new regulatory regime, Solvency II, is due to be introduced in 2012.4 The 
current Solvency II proposals, if adopted, will require insurers to hold significant 
additional capital to back their annuity liabilities if longevity risk cannot be hedged 
effectively or marked to market. 
 
By any measure, longevity risk is a significant risk. Global pension private-sector 
liabilities are of the order of $25trn.5  In the UK alone, private-sector DB pension 
liabilities exceed £1trn, DC pension assets amount to £450bn and insurance company 
annuity books exceed £125bn.6 It has been estimated that every additional year of life 
expectancy at age 65 adds around 3 percent or £30bn to the present value of DB 
pension liabilities in the UK, with a similar impact on lifetime annuities.7 The most 
recent estimates for UK state pension liabilities were £1,170bn in respect of social 
security pensions8 and £770bn in respect of the unfunded pension plans of public-
sector employees.9 The most recent valuation of local authority pension liabilities 
came to £159bn.10 This implies that UK government-backed longevity-linked 
liabilities exceed £2trn. 
 
In addition to being extensive, longevity risk in the private sector is beginning to 
become concentrated, especially in the UK. Private-sector companies in the UK are 
moving rapidly away from DB pension provision. They are beginning to offload the 
legacy longevity risk that they still hold either by buying-in annuities from life 
companies to cover their pensions-in-payment or by undertaking bulk buy-outs of 
their liabilities, again with life companies.11 In providing these indemnification 
solutions for DB pension plans, insurance companies are beginning to play a big role 
in aggregating longevity risk in the economy. 
 
The DB plans in private-sector companies in the UK are being replaced with 
occupational DC plans – the equivalent of 401(k) plans in the USA – and, in so doing, 
                                                 
4 Solvency II is similar to the banks’ regulatory regime Basel II, and its purpose is to align regulatory 
capital more closely with economic capital.  
5 OECD (2008). 
6 Pension Protection Fund and the Pensions Regulator (2008); Association of British Insurers. 
7 Pension Protection Fund and the Pensions Regulator (2006, Table 5.6).  
8 Office for National Statistics (2010): the figure is for 2003. 
9 Pre-Budget Report of the UK Government 2009; the figure is for March 2008. 
10 Local Government Pension Scheme actuarial valuation, 31 March 2007. 
11 Bulk-buyouts transfer the pension liabilities in corporate pension plans to insurance companies. This 
market began in earnest in the UK in 1999, when the Prudential Assurance Company did £1bn of 
business.  
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companies are passing the longevity risk back to their employees. So individuals 
should be concerned because there is a real risk that they will outlive their wealth – 
this is the specific risk identified in Figure 1 – if they do not hedge this risk by buying 
life annuities. In countries such as the UK, where it is effectively compulsory to 
annuitize DC pension pots by age 75 at the latest, it will again be life companies that 
provide these annuities.  
 
So all the trends in pension provision – increasing demand from DB plans to use 
annuities to back their pensions in payment, the growing demand from DB plans for 
bulk buy-outs, the overall growth in both the number and size of DC pension funds 
and the associated growth in the number of pensioners with DC funds reaching 
retirement – are pointing to a big increase in demand for annuities provided by 
insurance companies.  
 
There are two problems with this increased demand. First, there is the danger that this 
could result in an unhealthy concentration of risk amongst a small number of 
insurance companies. Second, there is insufficient capital in the insurance/reinsurance 
industry to deal with total global private-sector longevity risk. Under Solvency II, it is 
proposed that insurance liabilities are increased by the addition of a market value 
margin (MVM) reflecting the cost of capital to cover ‘non-hedgeable’ risks. For 
annuity companies this is principally longevity risk. It is currently proposed that in the 
absence of a hedging instrument for longevity risk, EU insurers will have to charge a 
6% cost of capital above the risk-free rate when calculating the MVM. As a 
consequence of the long-dated nature of annuities, this calculation would result in the 
amount of capital held for longevity risk approximately doubling from current levels. 
The resultant extra capital would have to be passed on to customers and the money’s 
worth of annuities could fall by up to 10%. A UK national newspaper has reported 
that one of the largest UK insurers, Legal & General, is considering the option of 
relocating its corporate headquarters outside of the EU ahead of the introduction of 
Solvency II.12  
 
The only realistic way of handling these issues, at least for accrued pension liabilities, 
is to pass some of the risk onto Governments and the capital markets. The alternative 
is poorer value annuities, an annuity market prone to insolvency or, in the extreme, no 
private-sector annuity market at all. All Governments that have encouraged the 
growth of DC pension provision should be concerned about this. But, by issuing 
Longevity Bonds, Governments can help to overcome these problems.  
 
IV. How can Longevity Bonds hedge aggregate longevity risk? 
 
In order to see how a Longevity Bond can hedge aggregate longevity risk, we need to 
both quantify longevity risk and identify where it is concentrated. Figure 2 presents a 
survivor fan chart13 derived using the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) stochastic mortality 
model.14 The fan chart shows the uncertainty surrounding projections of the number 
of survivors to each age from the cohort of males from the national population of 
England and Wales who are aged 65 at the end of 2006.15 The bars indicate the 90% 
                                                 
12 Sunday Telegraph, 20 December 2009.  
13 Blake et al. (2008).  
14 Cairns et al. (2006).   
15 The CBD model was estimated using data between 1991 and 2006. 
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confidence interval on the projected survivor rate for each age out to 115. The line in 
the middle of each bar indicates the expected proportion of the cohort to survive to 
each age. The Figure shows that there is little uncertainty out to age 75: we can be 
fairly confident that approximately 19% will have died by 75. The uncertainty peaks 
at age 93: the confidence interval band is widest at this age. The best estimate is that 
36% will survive to age 90, but it could be anywhere between 30% and 41%. This is a 
very large range. The Figure also shows the extent of the so-called ‘tail risk’ after age 
90: there is some probability – even if small – that some members of this cohort will 
live beyond 110. 
 
Figure 2: Survivor fan chart - Males aged 65 
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Note: Derived from the Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality model, estimated on English and Welsh male mortality 
data for 65-year olds over the period 1991-2006 
 
A survivor fan chart is very useful to a pension plan or annuity provider since it shows 
the likely range of pensioners or annuitants from a given birth cohort surviving to 
each age. If more survive to each age than was expected, the pension plan or annuity 
provider has to make higher total pension or annuity payments than was anticipated. 
The opposite holds if fewer survive to each age than was anticipated. The best 
estimate expectation of life is 20.5 years; the 5% confidence level expectation is 19.4 
years and the 95% confidence level expectation is 21.8 years.  
 
We will now show how a Longevity Bond with the following characteristics can help 
to hedge aggregate longevity risk: 
• The bond pays coupons that decline over time in line with the actual mortality 
experience of a cohort of the population, say 65-year-old males from the 
national population: so the coupons payable at age 75, for example, will 
depend on the proportion of 65-year-old males who survive to age 75 
• Coupon payments are not made for ages for which longevity risk is low: so, 
for example, the first coupon might not be paid until the cohort reaches age 75 
(such a bond would be denoted as a Deferred Longevity Bond) 
• The coupon payments continue until the maturity date of the bond which 
might, for example, be 40 years after the issue date when the cohort of males 
reaches age 105 
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• The final coupon incorporates a terminal payment equal to the discounted 
value of the sum of the post-105 survivor rates to account for those who 
survive beyond age 105. The terminal payment is calculated on the maturity 
date of the bond and will depend on the numbers of the cohort still alive at that 
time and projections of their remaining survivorship. It is intended to avoid the 
payment of trivial sums at very high ages 
• The bond pays coupons only and has no principal repayment. 
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Figure 3: Deferred Longevity Bond for male aged 65 with 10-year 
deferment
Longevity Bond payable from age 75 with terminal payment 
at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk
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Figure 3 shows the possible range of coupon payments on a Deferred Longevity 
Bond based on the national population of English and Welsh males who were aged 65 
at the end of 2006.  Such a bond would provide a hedge for the aggregate longevity 
risk faced by pension plans and annuity providers. If population survivorship is higher 
at each age than was expected, the bond pays out higher coupons. This is what 
pension plans and annuity providers need to help match the higher than expected 
pensions and annuity payments they need to make. If, on the other hand, survivorship 
is lower at each age than was expected, the bond pays out lower coupons. But the 
pension plans and annuity providers are not likely to mind this, since their pensions 
and annuity payments are also likely to be lower. 
 
However, it is important to recognize that the bond will only provide a perfect hedge 
for the aggregate longevity risk faced by pension plans and annuity providers if the 
plan members and annuitants have exactly the same mortality experience over time as 
the cohort underlying the bond. If the plan members and annuitants have a mortality 
experience that differs from that of the national population, this will introduce basis 
risk.16  In practice, there will always be some basis risk. One reason for this is that 
                                                 
16 This is the risk that the ‘underlying’ – in this case, the survivor rates of the particular population 
being hedged – does not move in line with the hedging instrument – which, in this case, depends on the 
survivor rates of the national population.  
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pension plans and annuity books have far fewer members than the national population 
and will therefore experience greater random variation risk than the national 
population and this is likely to cause the mortality experience of a sub-population to 
diverge from that of the national population over time, even if they have the same 
mortality profile at the outset.  
 
Another reason is that most pension plans and annuity books will not have the same 
mortality profile as the national population, even to begin with. There can be 
differences in age, gender and socio-economic composition. Different birth cohorts 
have different survivor rates to each age. While survivor rates to each age tend to 
increase over time, in line with the trend improvement in longevity, they do not do so 
uniformly: some birth cohorts experience faster improvements than others.17 Females, 
on average, live longer than males. Professionals tend to live longer than white-collar 
workers who in turn tend to live longer than blue-collar and manual workers. But it is 
not simply the differences in life expectancies between these various groups that are 
important, it is unexpected changes in the trends in their survivorship experience that 
causes basis risk.  
 
Yet another reason for basis risk involves the difference between ‘lives’ and 
‘amounts’. A population longevity index18 will weight each life equally, but members 
of the higher socio-economic groups will tend to have higher pensions and annuities 
than members of the lower socio-economic groups. They are also more likely to have 
multiple annuities. The directors of a small manufacturing company are likely to 
represent a large share of the company’s pension plan liabilities and are more likely to 
live longer than the average member. All these factors will increase basis risk and its 
complexity.  
 
In theory, there could be a Longevity Bond for both males and females, for each age 
and for each socio-economic group. Such granularity of the Longevity Bond market 
would allow a high degree of hedge effectiveness to be achieved. But it would also 
result in negligible liquidity or pricing transparency: the more bonds there are, the less 
trading there will be in each bond and the less frequently the bonds will be priced. As 
is the case in other markets – especially derivatives markets – a small number of 
suitably designed bonds should provide an appropriate balance between hedge 
effectiveness, liquidity and pricing transparency.19 
 
Not only are Longevity Bonds useful for hedging aggregate longevity risk once 
pensioners have retired, they could be used to hedge aggregate longevity risk and 
long-term investment risk in the period leading up to retirement. A typical DC plan 
will use a life-style (or life-cycle) investment strategy. This involves a high weighting 
in equities in the early stages of the accumulation process in order to benefit from the 
equity risk premium. There is then a systematic switch to less volatile assets, typically 
long-dated fixed-income bonds, during the final stages of the accumulation process – 
the so-called glide path to retirement – in order to reduce the volatility of the lifetime 
retirement income secured at retirement.  While the fixed-income bonds hedge the 
                                                 
17 Willetts (2004), Richards et al. (2006).  
18 This is an index based on the mortality experience of the national population. 
19 See the discussion in section 8 of Blake et al. (2006). 
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interest-rate risk in the purchase of an annuity,20 they do not hedge the longevity 
risk.21   
 
Both interest-rate risk and longevity risk could be hedged along the glide path if plan 
members invested in a fund containing Longevity Bonds. This would give plan 
members greater certainty of income in the run up to retirement. This follows because 
the price of future lifetime annuities (at the member’s retirement date) should be 
highly correlated with the value of this fund which will rise if longevity improves 
faster than expected or if long-term interest rates fall, and reduce if longevity  
expectations decline or interest rates rise. The fund might be a better way of providing 
income security from a DC pension plan at retirement than the alternative of 
purchasing deferred annuities, since the annuity provider might have to hold 
significant capital against the deferred annuities it sold (at least this is true in the UK), 
the cost of which would have to be passed onto the member. 
 
V. Why should the Government issue Longevity Bonds? 
 
In principle, Longevity Bonds could be issued by private-sector organizations. It has 
been argued that pharmaceutical companies would be natural issuers of Longevity 
Bonds, since their revenues are positively linked to survivorship: the longer people 
live, the more they will spend on medicines.22 While this is true, the scale of the 
demand for Longevity Bonds far exceeds conceivable private-sector supply from 
companies such as pharmaceuticals. Further, there would be significant credit risk 
associated with the private-sector issuance of an instrument intended to hedge an 
aggregate risk many years into the future. In practice, the only realistic issuer of 
Longevity Bonds in scale is the Government.23  
 
We believe that there are three important reasons why the Government should engage 
in sharing longevity risk with the private sector. It: 
 
• has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market 
 
• has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers 
 
• is best placed to engage in intergenerational risk sharing, such as by providing 
tail risk protection against aggregate trend risk. 
 
A. An efficient annuity market for pensioners 
 
The Government has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market, given 
its desire to encourage retirement savings in DC pension plans that rely on annuities 
to turn pension savings into guaranteed lifetime retirement income. If the private 
                                                 
20 Since annuity providers buy bonds to make the annuity payments, annuities are subject to interest-
rate risk. If interest rates fall, bond prices rise and this will reduce the amount of the annuity that can be 
paid from a given lump sum.  
21 If longevity improves at a higher rate than that expected along the glide path, this too will reduce the 
amount of the annuity that can be paid from a given lump sum.  
22 Dowd (2003). 
23 The first suggestion for Governments to do this was made in Blake and Burrows (2001). 
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sector is unable to hedge aggregate longevity risk, it increases the likelihood that 
insurance companies stop selling annuities or increase annuity prices which would 
reduce pensioner income in retirement.  
 
A consequence of the above is that Governments might find themselves having to pay 
additional means-tested benefits to supplement pensioners’ incomes, as well as 
receiving lower income tax and expenditure taxes (such as Value Added Tax in the 
UK) from pensioners due to their lower incomes.24 This will, ceteris paribus, lead to 
higher taxes on the working population. This outcome will therefore not be popular 
with workers or pensioners. Further, workers are likely to reduce savings into DC 
pension plans. Those that do continue to save in DC plans will face even greater 
uncertainty about their prospective pension income, since an efficient private-sector 
annuity market might no longer be in existence when they retire. 
 
B. An efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers 
 
The capital markets have a key role to help ensure there is an efficient annuity market 
and to reduce concentration risk.  It can therefore also be argued that the Government 
has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers. There are two areas where Government support is required. 
 
First, the Government can help with the construction of national longevity indices. It 
is for reasons of accuracy that longevity indices would most likely have to be based 
on national mortality data. A key component of the success of the new capital market 
will be the timely publication of accurate and independently calculated longevity 
indices. The longevity indices would cover mortality rates, survivor rates and life 
expectancies for both males and females. 
 
Only the Government has access to the information necessary to produce these indices 
on account of the legal requirement to report deaths and related information such as 
dates of death and birth and gender to an official agency, which in the UK is the 
General Register Office of Births, Marriages and Deaths. Further, only the 
Government has access to the information needed to estimate the size of the exposed 
population. In the UK, this is currently derived from decadal censuses with annual 
updates between censuses based on reported deaths and estimated migration flows. 
However, the resulting estimates are not accurate enough at high ages. It is important 
to be able to track a cohort over time, particularly at high ages: the Government is in a 
unique position to do this, since it makes social security pension payments to almost 
every old person and needs to keep good records to do this. While longevity indices 
based on social class would be useful, the social class of a deceased person is not 
recorded at the time of death and while attempts have been made to construct social 
class indices, based on factors such as zip code or post code, these lack the accuracy 
of national indices. A similar argument would hold for longevity indices based on 
amounts rather than lives. 
 
Second, the Government can make an important contribution by issuing Longevity 
Bonds to facilitate price discovery, thereby encouraging capital market development.     
                                                 
24 Many of the people buying annuities in the UK are also on means-tested benefits. Any reduction in 
annuity payments arising from more onerous capital requirements resulting from insurers being unable 
to hedge longevity risk will immediately increase means-tested benefits. 
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Longevity risk is not currently actively traded in the capital markets, so we do not 
have a good estimate of its market price or premium.25 But if the Government issued 
a small number of Longevity Bonds, this would help to establish and maintain the 
market-clearing ‘price points’ for longevity risk at key ages and future dates, and 
hence establish a market price for longevity risk. In other words, the bonds would 
help to establish the riskless term structure for survivor rates for ages above 65 for 
future years.26 There is a clear analogy with the fixed-income and index-linked (TIPS 
in the US) bond markets. In these markets, the issue of Government bonds helped to 
establish the riskless term structures for interest rates and inflation rate expectations, 
respectively, for terms out to 50 years or more. The private sector was then able to 
issue corporate fixed-income and index-linked bonds with different credit risks 
(AAA, AA etc) and establish credit term structures above the riskless benchmark 
curves.  
 
The longevity risk term structure is more complex than either the interest rate or 
inflation term structures, since it is two-dimensional – involving age as well as time –  
whereas the  latter are one-dimensional, involving only time. The longevity risk term 
structure is therefore a two-dimensional surface, rather than a line: cohorts move 
diagonally across the surface over time, getting one year older with every passing 
year, with some members of the cohort dying each year. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 4 which shows the cash flows on two Deferred Longevity Bonds: one bond 
based on male lives from the national population aged 65 and one bond based on male 
lives from the national population aged 75. Each bond is specified by four dates: the 
birth year of the cohort being tracked (e.g., 1945), the issue date (e.g. 2010), the first 
payment date (e.g., 2020) and the last payment date (e.g., 2050).27 There is a 
corresponding mortality term structure for females, so Longevity Bonds are also 
identified by gender (M or F). 
                                                 
25 The longevity risk premium is paid by the Longevity Bond’s buyer to the bond’s issuer to remove 
aggregate longevity risk. It therefore results in a lower coupon that the bond’s issuer has to pay the 
bond’s buyer for purchasing the bond, thereby lowering the effective yield on the bond.  
26 Currently, the survivor rates for future years are based on model projections, such as the CDB model. 
Figure 2 illustrates this for males aged 65 at the end of 2006. The theoretically fair price of a 
Longevity Bond could therefore be determined using the CBD model.  However, with a traded market 
in Longevity Bonds, a market view of future survival rates would replace model projections and the 
resulting price points would be used in determining the market price of the bonds. Pricing-to-market 
would replace pricing-to-model.   
27 If a strips market in Longevity Bonds develops – as happens with fixed-income and index-linked 
bonds – then hedgers could buy the subset of the coupon payments that most closely meets their 
hedging requirements, rather than having to buy the whole bond.  In addition, if the individual coupons 
in Figure 4 are traded separately, this will allow more accurate determination of the price points for 
longevity risk along the diagonals of the longevity risk term structure.  
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Figure 4: Longevity Bond cash flows across ages and time
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The establishment of a market price for longevity risk would be particularly useful for 
EU insurance companies operating under Solvency II. The maximum longevity risk 
premium that an annuity provider would be willing to pay to buy a Longevity Bond 
would be related to the level of capital that the Regulators agree can be released as a 
result of holding the Longevity Bond to back annuity liabilities.28  
 
The establishment of price points will also help to facilitate the capital market 
development of longevity swaps29 and other longevity derivatives similar to the 
interest-rate and inflation swaps that developed in the fixed-income and index-linked 
bond markets. Market participants were able to use market interest-rate and inflation 
expectations, rather than projections from models. The same would happen in the 
longevity swaps market. The longevity swaps market began to develop in the UK in 
2007-09 with eight publicly announced swaps involving six annuity providers and 
two pension funds. A number of global investment banks and reinsurers intermediated 
the deals – J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, RBS, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and 
SwissRe – and the longevity risk was passed through to investors – such as insurance-
linked securities (ILS) investors, hedge funds and endowments – attracted by a new 
                                                 
28 It will also be related to the basis risk that remains unhedged and potentially the size of any 
illiquidity premium contained in the price of Longevity Bonds. If Longevity Bonds are not actively 
traded, investors will demand an illiquidity premium to hold them and the Regulator might be reluctant 
to accept that the bonds’ prices can be used for mark-to-market pricing for capital release purposes. 
29 A longevity swap exchanges fixed for floating survivor rates over the tenor of the swap. The fixed 
rate might be set equal to the expected rates in Figure 2 plus the longevity risk premium. The floating 
rates are the realized rates which could be above or below the fixed rate. Each year, the pension plan or 
annuity provider pays the fixed rate and receives the floating rate and thereby locks in the cost of the 
pension or annuity payments. The first suggestion for longevity swaps – or survivor swaps – was made 
in Dowd et al. (2006).   
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asset class that is uncorrelated with traditional asset classes, such as equities, bonds 
and real estate.30  
 
C. Intergenerational risk sharing  
 
The Government is one of the few agencies in society that can engage in 
intergenerational risk sharing on a large scale and enforce intergenerational 
contracts.31 This is important, given that longevity risk is a risk that crosses a number 
of generations. This is how the intergenerational risk sharing operates. The 
Government would receive a longevity risk premium by issuing Longevity Bonds. In 
effect, the current retired population pays future generations an insurance premium to 
hedge its aggregate longevity risk. If, in equilibrium, the risk premium is sufficient to 
ensure that the generation bearing the risk is adequately compensated, then each 
generation is treated fairly. 
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Longevity Bond payable from age 90 with terminal payment 
at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk
Figure 5: Deferred Tail Longevity Bond for male aged 65 
AGE
PAYMENT
Expected value 90% confidence 
Terminal 
Payment
Note: See note to Figure 2
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with this segment in 
long run
 
A key role for Government in this context is to provide a hedge for aggregate 
longevity risk by providing tail risk protection against trend risk. Once the market for 
Longevity Bonds has matured, in the sense of producing stable and reliable price 
points in the age range 65-90, the capital markets can take over responsibility for 
providing the necessary hedging capacity in this age range using longevity securities 
and derivatives. All that might then be needed would be for the Government to 
provide a continuous supply of Deferred Tail Longevity Bonds with payments 
starting from age 90 in order to allow pension plans and insurers to hedge their tail 
                                                 
30 It has been reported that there has been ‘a sudden wall of demand’ for longevity swaps in the second 
half of 2009 from UK pension plans in the UK according to Pensions Week (23 November 2009) with 
quotes for around £60bn worth of swaps during the previous 6-8 months.  
31 In the private sector, long-term contracts can involve significant credit risk as mentioned above and 
collateralization can introduce significant frictional costs 
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risk.32 Figure 5 illustrates the cash flows on such a bond.  These bonds will be 
necessary on a permanent basis, since the capital that annuity providers would be 
required by the Regulator to post in order to cover this risk would be very high in the 
absence of a close matching asset. The bonds are also necessary because the investors 
who have recently become interested in taking the other side of the longevity swaps 
market have no appetite for hedging long-duration tail longevity risk. 
 
D. Dealing with a counter-argument  
 
While we feel we have put forward a number of strong arguments supporting the case 
for Government issuance of Longevity Bonds, we do need to acknowledge and refute 
an important counter-argument. Concerns have been raised that Governments are not 
natural issuers of Longevity Bonds because of their large existing exposure – in 
excess of £2trn in the case of the UK Government – to longevity risk.   
 
We would argue that the Government’s exposure to unanticipated longevity 
improvements through the issuance of Longevity Bonds is – or at least could be – 
well hedged. First, the Government receives a longevity risk premium from issuing 
the bonds. Second, in the event that the risk premium proves to be insufficient, the 
Government can reduce its State pension spend and increase its pre-retirement tax 
take by raising the State pension age. The next generation might have to work longer, 
but will, in any case, be a fitter generation and so be able to earn more income which, 
in turn, will produce more tax. Third, since the issuance of Longevity Bonds should 
result in a more efficient annuity market and hence higher incomes in retirement, this 
should also result in an increase in the tax take and help to reduce the amount of 
means-tested benefits. The higher tax take and lower means-tested benefits arising 
from a more efficient annuity market post-Solvency II applies to the lifetimes of all 
pensioners buying an annuity, whereas the tail risk protection provided by Deferred 
Tail Longevity Bonds applies only to those surviving over 90, some 25 years in the 
future.  
 
Overall, once the Government is only issuing Deferred Tail Longevity Bonds, the 
risk will be very manageable and consistent with the Government’s role of facilitating 
intergenerational risk sharing. We believe that there could be a significant cost-benefit 
to the Government from the issuance of Longevity Bonds and therefore a strong, 
indeed overwhelming, case for the Government to issue Longevity Bonds.  
 
VI. What is the potential demand for Longevity Bonds? 
 
The demand for Longevity Bonds is driven principally by the growth of DC pensions 
and the growing maturity of DB plans. The market in DB longevity risk management 
is new and there is a significant programme currently being implemented in the UK 
by investment banks and actuarial consultants to educate DB pension plan trustees 
and annuity providers about the benefits of longevity risk hedging. Although the 
investment banks have an incentive to talk up the market, the demand is genuine. We 
believe that the potential demand for Longevity Bonds is substantial.  
                                                 
32 Pension plans and annuity providers might still be willing to invest in Government-issued Longevity 
Bonds covering the age range 65-90 if they are competitively priced compared with capital market 
hedges. 
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In the UK alone: of the £1trn in DB private-sector pension liabilities, around £500bn 
relate to pensions in payment; of the £450bn in accumulated DC pension assets, 
£150bn relate to people over age 55; and insurance companies are committed to 
making annuity payments valued in excess of £125bn over the lifetime of the 
payments.  
 
We believe that a suitable initial issuance of Longevity Bonds (with 10-year 
deferment) by the UK Government could be four bonds: LBM(65,75), LBF(65,75),   
LBM(75,85) and LBF(75,85).33 The size of each bond issue will depend, in part, on 
price and this will be considered in the next section. However, the total issuance is 
likely to be small in relation to the overall size of the Government bond market and is 
unlikely to become a principal funding source for Government.34 Nevertheless, the 
issuance will have significant value, since it will improve the efficiency of the annuity 
market as well as providing a useful risk management tool for DB plans. 
 
 
VII. Pricing considerations  
 
Ultimately, the demand for Longevity Bonds will depend on their price. Demand will 
be higher the closer the Government offers the bonds at true economic cost, i.e., 
charges a fair, but not excessive, longevity risk premium. It is right that the 
Government seeks to charge a fair risk premium on Longevity Bonds because this 
ensures intergenerational fairness. The expected cost of the longevity risk should be 
borne by those whose retirement incomes will be derived from the bonds.  
 
Some might argue that the Government should seek to charge a risk premium in 
excess of the economic cost. For example, if, in a Solvency II world, insurance 
companies writing annuity business end up having to hold capital in excess of true 
economic levels, because they are unable to hedge longevity risk, then they might be 
prepared to pay a premium price for Longevity Bonds if, by doing so, they can 
reduce their capital requirements. This would obviously depend on the Solvency II 
treatment of Longevity Bonds and the capital reduction that the Regulators would 
allow. However, it would be short sighted of the Government to seek to exploit this 
situation. If insurance companies can reduce their capital requirements to closer to 
economic capital levels, then this should result in higher annuity values with the 
consequent benefits to Government, pensioners and savers already highlighted. 
 
We also believe that it is most unlikely that the desired market for Longevity Bonds 
will develop if the Government just focuses on insurers. The bonds will need to be 
priced to attract DB pension plans which do not currently face solvency capital 
requirements. DB plans which do not have a pressing need for a full buy-out using 
annuities (which will be subject to Solvency II capital via insurers) and which want  
to engage in risk management will only buy Longevity Bonds if they believe they are 
priced fairly (and cheaper than longevity swaps and other derivative longevity hedges 
provided by the private sector).  So, if we want to ensure DB pension plans buy 
Longevity Bonds issued by the Government, the Government should not price them 
                                                 
33 LBM(65,75) is a Longevity Bond for males aged 65, with the first coupon paid at age 75, etc. 
34 Total UK Government bond issuance will exceed £700bn over the next 5 years as a consequence of 
the fallout from the 2007-08 Global Banking Crisis. 
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above AAA. Members in DC pension plans life-styling in the run up to their 
retirement will have a choice between using long-dated bonds and Longevity Bonds 
and again many will be discouraged from using Longevity Bonds if the Government 
looks to charge a mark-up beyond the fair price. Other investors, including investment 
banks, will also be discouraged from buying Longevity Bonds if they believe the 
longevity risk premium is excessive, because they will fear that the bonds will 
eventually fall in value to reflect their true economic cost. 
 
So for the market in Longevity Bonds to take off, we believe they should be priced 
according to economic capital principles. The analysis below is intended to initiate the 
process of defining what is the fair economic price. Our intention is not to determine 
that price; rather it is to indicate one possible approach and the issues that need to be 
resolved for determining what the fair price might be. The approach we have adopted 
builds on the insurance industry ‘cost-of-capital method’.35  This determines a risk 
margin for capital above the best estimate of the value of the liabilities. The best 
estimate of the value of the liabilities in our model is derived from the median 
scenario and, at any point in time, is the present value of the expected future coupons 
on the bond from the median scenario discounted at the risk-free rate. The cost-of-
capital method involves four stages: 
 
• determine the required credit rating for the bond 
 
• project the longevity risk capital required for each year in the life of the bond 
to maintain the required credit rating 
 
• multiply each annual capital requirement by a percentage cost of capital to 
give the cost of capital in money terms  
 
• calculate the present value of each of these cost-of-capital amounts using a 
risk-free discount rate and sum to give the present value of the overall capital 
requirement. 
 
The starting point for quantifying the minimum risk premium that the Government 
should charge to ensure intergenerational fairness is to consider the notional level of 
capital it would need to hold to achieve at least a AAA rating. It is important to realize 
that the Government will not actually hold this capital – unlike an insurer – but simply 
uses the notional required capital amount to calculate the cost of capital for each year 
of the bond’s life. To calculate this notional capital, we ideally need to use stochastic 
mortality and interest rate modelling to determine the amount of notional capital that 
would apply throughout the duration of the bond to ensure the bond’s payments 
would be made with a continuing AAA level of confidence.  
 
Our first task is to derive the survival probability on AAA bonds. We assume a yearly 
survival probability of 0.9995 in the analysis below to reflect the high standard of 
security that would be associated with Government-issued Longevity Bonds. This is 
marginally higher than the annualized 20-year survival rates on AAA bonds of 0.9991 
between 1970 and 2008 and 0.9994 between 1920 and 2008.36  
                                                 
35 Chief Risk Officer Forum (2008). 
36 The desired survival probability could be higher if required. 
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Table 1: Distribution of life expectancies and Longevity Bond present values 
 
Quantile e65 PV(65,65) PV(65,75) PV(65,90) e75 PV(75,75) PV(75,85) PV(75,90)
                  
0.005 18.77 94.68 88.02 60.36 10.96 93.28 79.06 66.04 
0.01 18.93 95.22 89.14 63.55 11.07 93.94 81.34 69.40 
0.025 19.17 95.97 90.81 68.42 11.20 94.81 83.82 73.22 
0.05 19.37 96.57 92.19 72.44 11.34 95.67 86.48 77.63 
0.5 20.51 100.00 100.00 100.00 12.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 
0.95 21.82 103.65 108.39 134.43 12.79 104.57 114.76 126.10 
0.975 22.07 104.34 109.98 141.43 12.94 105.37 117.62 131.67 
0.99 22.38 105.12 111.73 150.07 13.14 106.57 121.17 138.73 
0.995 22.57 105.63 113.03 155.36 13.28 107.31 123.87 143.24 
Mean 20.53 100.03 100.09 101.25 12.04 100.05 100.19 100.65 
                  
Median annuity 
factor 12.619 5.222 0.675   8.420 2.106 0.815 
Base coupon (£) 7.925 19.149 148.133   11.876 47.493 122.730 
 
Notes: Derived from the CBD model estimated on English and Welsh male data for age 65 over the period 1991-2006. 
e65 and e75 = life expectancy at ages 65 and 75. PV(65,65) = present value of  a bond with base coupon of £7.925 for a 
male aged 65, payable from age 65. PV(65,75) = present value of  a bond with base coupon of £19.15 for a male aged 
65, payable from age 75.  PV(65,90) = present value of a bond with base coupon of £148.13 for a male aged 65, payable 
from age 90. The discount rate is assumed to be a risk free 4%. The median annuity factor is the present value of a base 
coupon of one unit payable yearly in arrears multiplied by the proportion of the cohort still alive at the end of each year, 
for the life of the annuitant from a given age. The base coupon is derived by dividing the median price of the bond (set 
as 100) by the median annuity factor. The actual coupon in each year a coupon is due is equal to the (rescaled) base 
coupon multiplied by the percentage of the population surviving between the bond’s issue date and the coupon payment 
date.  
 
We then used the CBD model to project 10,000 longevity scenarios for English and 
Welsh males aged 65 at the end of 2006 (as shown in Figures 2, 3 and 5) and these 
were, in turn, used to calculate 10,000 present values of the coupon payments on a 
range of different types of Longevity Bond. Table 1 shows the distribution of life 
expectancies for males aged 65 and 75 at the end of 2006, according to the CBD 
model and quantiles of the distributions of Longevity Bond present values, payable 
immediately (PV(65,65) and PV(75,75)), payable from age 75 (PV(65,75)), payable 
from age 85 (PV(75,85)) and payable from age 90 (PV(65,90) and PV(75,90)), 
respectively.  For convenience, the median present value for each bond has been 
rescaled to £100 by adjusting the base coupon. A fixed risk-free discount rate of 4% is 
assumed throughout.37 Further, no allowance is made for expenses and other 
operational risks, since we are looking to quantify the pure price of the risk premium 
for longevity. 
 
We now need to determine the relevant quantiles of the distribution of present values 
to achieve a AAA rating. We do this at the undiscounted mean term of the expected 
                                                 
37 A more sophisticated approach would stochastically model the risk-free term structure. 
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payments.38 Table 2 shows the mean term on the issue date for a range of different 
bonds. The corresponding AAA quantiles are shown in the last column. These are 
found by raising the survival probability of 0.9995 to the power of the mean term. 
 
 
Table 2: Mean term of Longevity Bonds and corresponding AAA quantiles on 
issue date of bonds 
Longevity Bond Mean Term AAA quantile 
LBM(65,65) 13.21 0.99341 
LBM(65,75) 19.73 0.99018 
LBM(65,90) 30.51 0.98486 
LBM(75,75) 8.72 0.99565 
LBM(75,85) 16.00 0.99203 
LBM(75,90) 19.87 0.99011 
Notes: The mean term is found by summing the expected coupons on a bond weighted by the number 
of years ahead each coupon occurs and then dividing by the sum of the expected coupons.  The 
corresponding AAA quantile is found by raising the survival probability of 0.9995 to the power of the 
mean term. For the LBM(65,65) bond, the mean term is 13.21 years and the corresponding AAA 
quantile is 0.999513.21 = 0.99341. 
  
 
Using the information in Tables 1 and 2, we can determine the initial notional capital 
that is required for a AAA rating and then use this to calculate the cost of capital for 
each year of the bond’s life.  
 
Take, for example, the LBM(65,75) bond (i.e., one based on males age 65 with 
payments starting at age 75). On the issue date, the mean term is 19.73 years and 
therefore the AAA capital requirement can be derived from the 0.99018 quantile (see 
Table 2), giving an initial capital requirement of 11.73% (see Table 1 – the 0.99 
quantile is £111.73, while the median is £100). Figure 6 shows graphically the level 
of economic capital required for the first year. 
 
                                                 
38 An alternative would have been to use the discounted mean term or duration of the bond. This, 
however, has the effect that it changes when the discount rate changes. This is inappropriate because 
the potential dispersion of projected cash flows, and hence the risk against which capital is being held, 
does not depend on interest rates. We did, however, examine the effect of using the discounted mean 
term with a fixed discount rate of 4% and it made very little difference to the final estimate of the 
longevity risk premium.  
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For subsequent years, we continue to use the best estimate of the bond’s coupons 
from the median scenario. However, we need to re-run the CBD model to produce 
new sets of 10,000 scenarios for each year in the future. In doing this, we assume that 
mortality rates follow the best estimate path from the median scenario up to the year 
(and associated age) that we are modelling and then we produce a new stochastic 
distribution of outcomes using drift and volatility parameters consistent with the CBD 
model used in the first year.  
 
Although this results in a narrowing funnel of doubt as each year passes,39 the mean 
term of the expected cash payments also reduces and this requires higher quantiles of 
the distribution to be used each year to maintain the desired AAA credit rating for the 
bond.40 The net outcome of these opposing effects results in a lower capital mark-up 
percentage over time. Table 3 shows a subset of the mean terms, the resultant AAA 
quantiles and the capital mark-up percentages for LBM(65,75) and LBM(75,85) that 
can be applied to the series of best estimate liabilities derived from the median 
scenario. 
 
It is therefore possible using the CBD model to calculate the notional required AAA 
capital holdings for longevity risk for each year for any bond. We now need to 
multiply each one of these by the cost of capital and a risk-free discount factor and 
sum this series to produce the required risk premium which can be expressed as a 
percentage of the expected bond price of 100. We can then convert this to an effective 
basis points reduction from the risk-free rate.  
 
 
 
39 As the age 65 and 75 cohorts grow older, the range of possible outcomes narrows.  
40 This follows because 0.9995 raised to the power of a lower mean term produces a higher quantile 
than 0.9995 raised to the power of a higher mean term as Table 2 shows. 
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 Table 3: Mean term, AAA quantiles and resultant AAA capital as a percentage of 
best estimate liabilities 
  
 
LBM(65,75) 
 
 
LBM(75,85) 
 
Age Mean term Quantile Capital % Mean term Quantile Capital % 
65 19.73 0.99018 11.73%       
70 14.73 0.99266 11.31%       
75 9.73 0.99515 11.01% 16.00 0.99203 21.81% 
80 8.16 0.99593 10.34% 14.73 0.99266 20.70% 
85 6.76 0.99663 10.05% 9.73 0.99515 19.89% 
90 5.51 0.99725 9.66% 8.16 0.99593 18.31% 
95 4.44 0.99778 9.04% 6.76 0.99663 17.05% 
100 3.54 0.99823 8.52% 5.51 0.99725 15.82% 
105 2.82 0.99859 8.07% 4.44 0.99778 13.98% 
110 2.27 0.99887 7.57% 3.54 0.99823 12.90% 
 
A critical factor in the process is to determine the appropriate cost of capital. This has 
been the subject of much debate in the run up to Solvency II where the annuity 
companies are currently expected to use a 6% risk premium when calculating their 
MVM. In the industry’s view, this is intended to cover a number of risk factors 
associated with annuity provision, the most significant being non-hedgeable longevity 
risk.41 The industry has therefore recommended a cost of capital in the range 2.5%-
4.5% p.a., based on the cost of non-hedgeable risks and a capital level calibrated to a 
0.995 survival probability over one year.42 This approximately translates into a cost of 
capital in the range 1.67%-3% p.a., based on a 0.9995 annual survival probability.43  
 
The upper end of this range is substantially higher than a Government would charge. 
This is because the longevity risk faced by Governments is lower than that faced by 
insurers because they have the benefit of having a more reliable estimate of current 
longevity exposures. They therefore have a more accurate starting point for modelling 
longevity improvement risk. They also face less random variability in trend 
improvements in longevity as Government-issued Longevity Bonds will be based on 
national population data. By contrast, the population relevant for insurers is a small 
and much more volatile subset of the national population. A case could therefore 
potentially be made for Government to use a cost of capital of around 2%.44 45 
 
                                                 
41 Chief Risk Officer Forum (op. cit.), p. 16-18. 
42 Chief Risk Officer Forum (op. cit.), p. 8. 
43 Chief Risk Officer Forum (op. cit ), Fig.1, p. 30. 
44 This would include an allowance for model risk, e.g., in the model used to project future mortality 
rates. 
45 An alternative approach to the cost-of-capital method used in this paper is the ‘percentile method’ 
which determines the level of capital needed to ensure that all payments can be met for a set percentage 
of all the scenarios. In the context of Solvency II, a probability of 75% has been suggested. By using 
the initial 10,000 present value scenarios from the CBM model, a 0.75 percentile risk premium can be 
determined and, in turn, an implied cost of capital can be calculated. In this case, the percentile method 
implies costs of capital of 2.11% for LBM(65,75), 1.75% for LBM(65,90) 2.77% for LBM(75,85) and 
2.45% for LBM(75,90). 
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Table 4 shows the total risk premium for a number of Longevity Bonds for 
illustrative costs of capital of 2% and 3%. It also shows the corresponding basis points 
reductions from the risk-free rate. Take LBM(65,75) and a 2% cost of capital, for 
example. This bond has a total risk premium of 3.2%. This means that the issue price 
of the bond would be £103.20. The effective yield on the bond is equal to the risk-free 
rate less the basis points reduction, so the effective yield on LBM(65,75) is 3.821%.46 
 
Table 4: Risk premiums and basis points reduction in yield on  
Longevity Bonds 
 
Bond 2% cost of capital 3% cost of capital 
 Risk premium Bps reduction Risk premium Bps reduction 
     
LBM(65,65) 1.4% 13.4 bps 2.0% 20.0 bps 
LBM(65,75) 3.2% 17.9 bps 4.7% 26.5 bps 
LBM(65,90) 15.1% 48.7 bps 22.6% 70.8 bps 
      
LBM(75,75) 1.2% 16.5 bps 1.8% 24.7 bps 
LBM(75,85) 4.1% 27.6 bps 6.2% 40.8 bps 
LBM(75,90) 8.2% 42.6 bps 12.4% 62.2 bps 
Notes: The risk premium is the total for each bond. The basis points reduction shows the annual 
reduction from the assumed risk-free yield of 4%.  
 
 
VIII. Who benefits from Government issuing Longevity Bonds? 
 
Who benefits from Governments assisting in encouraging the optimal sharing of 
longevity risk? The simple answer is everyone. Everyone should benefit from having 
a market price for longevity risk and the ability to hedge aggregate longevity risk. But 
there are also more specific benefits. 
 
The Government: 
• Gains by having both a more secure DC pension savings market and a more 
efficient annuity market, resulting in less means-tested benefits and a higher 
tax take 
• Should gain access to a new source of long-term funding which, by widening 
the investor base, lowers the cost of Government issuance 
• Is able to issue bonds with a deferred payment structure to help its current 
funding programme and improve its cash flow 
• Earns a market-determined longevity risk premium thereby further reducing 
the expected cost of the long-term national debt. 
 
For DB pension plans: 
• Have the opportunity to reduce longevity risks 
• Can hedge longevity risk exposure prior to buy out. 
 
                                                 
46 By using a discount rate of 3.821%, the present value of the coupon payments on the LBM(65,75) 
bond equals £103.20. 
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Insurers: 
• Can potentially establish a mark-to-market longevity risk term structure and 
hence hold the optimal level of economic capital or at least hold capital closer 
to the economic level 
• Longevity Bonds will help insurers to play an aggregating role in providing 
pension plans and individuals with longevity insurance, whilst being able to 
pass on a proportion of their risk to the capital market; this would reduce their 
longevity concentration risk and facilitate the spread of longevity risk around 
the capital markets. 
 
The capital markets: 
• Get help to kick start market participation through the establishment of 
reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term 
structure 
• Can build on this longevity risk term structure with liquid longevity 
derivatives. 
 
Investors: 
• Get access to a new (longevity-linked) asset class whose returns are 
uncorrelated with traditional asset classes, such as bonds, equities and real 
estate. 
 
Regulators: 
• A longevity risk term structure should help the insurers’ Regulator (the 
Financial Services Authority in the UK) validate insurers’ economic capital, 
thereby making regulation more robust 
• A longevity risk term structure should help the pension plans’ Regulator (the 
Pensions Regulator in the UK) to calculate any risk-based levy to a pension 
insurance plan47 
• Longevity Bonds should help an orderly transfer of longevity risk from DB 
plans to the capital markets, thereby reducing reliance on an uncertain sponsor 
covenant and reducing concentration risk amongst insurers, and, in turn, 
giving comfort to the pension plans’ Regulator.   
 
Pension plan members: 
• DB pension plan members potentially get better security 
• DC pension plan members get better valued annuities which produce a higher 
lifetime income when they retire 
• Further, individuals with DC pension plans would have a means of hedging 
the longevity risk associated with purchasing an annuity at retirement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 The Pensions Regulator in the UK is responsible for the regulation of occupational DB and DC 
schemes and attempts to limit the number of DB schemes needing support from the Pension Protection 
Fund (which was based on the US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation).    
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IX. Growing support for Government issuance of Longevity Bonds 
 
Support for Governments to issue Longevity Bonds is growing steadily, not only in 
the UK, where the situation is most immediate, but also internationally.  
 
The UK Pensions Commission suggested the Government should consider the use of 
Longevity Bonds to absorb tail risk for those over 90 or 95, provided it exits from 
other forms of longevity risk pre-retirement which it has done by linking State 
pension age to increases in life expectancy and by raising the future State pension age 
to 68 by 2046. “One possible limited role for Government may, however, be worth 
consideration: the absorption of the ‘extreme tail’ of longevity risk post-retirement, 
i.e., uncertainty about the mortality experience of the minority of people who live to 
very old ages, say, beyond 90 or beyond 95.”48 
 
The UK Confederation of British Industry (CBI), which represents British employers, 
has argued: “Government should drive development of a market in longevity bonds, a 
similar instrument to annuities, by which the payments on the bonds depend on the 
proportion of a reference population that is still surviving at the date of payment of 
each coupon. This should be done through limited seed capital and supporting policy 
work on the topic. Government could also consider how best to match government 
bond issues to pension scheme needs, including the provision of more long-dated 
bonds and whether government should issue mortality bonds itself.”49 
 
The IMF states: “With regard to longevity risk, which most insurers and pension fund 
managers describe as unhedgeable, some authorities have considered assuming a 
limited (but important) portion of longevity exposure, such as extreme longevity risk      
(e.g., persons over age 90). In this way, by assuming the tail risk, governments may 
also increase the capacity of the pension and insurance industries to supply annuity 
protection to sponsor companies, pension beneficiaries and households, and facilitate 
the broader development of longevity risk markets.”50 
 
According to the OECD: “Governments could improve the market for annuities by 
issuing longevity indexed bonds and by producing a longevity index.”51 
 
Finally, the World Economic Forum has argued: “Given the ongoing shift towards 
defined contribution pension arrangements, there will be a growing need for annuities 
to enhance the security of retirement income. Longevity-Indexed Bonds and markets 
for hedging longevity risk would therefore play a critical role in ensuring an adequate 
provision of annuities.”52  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Pension Commission (2005, p. 229). 
49 Redressing the Balance - Boosting the Economy and Protecting Pensions, CBI Brief, May 2009. 
50  International Monetary Fund (2006). 
51 Antolin and Blommestein (2007). 
52 World Economic Forum (2009). 
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X. Next Step 
 
The next step in this process is for Governments in countries with significant 
longevity risk exposure to set up a Working Party to undertake a cost-benefit analysis 
of the Government issuance of Longevity Bonds. The terms of reference of this 
working party should cover the benefits that would accrue, the scale of the longevity 
risk that Governments would be assuming, and the actions Governments can take to 
mitigate this risk. The working party should also work through the practicalities of 
issuing Longevity Bonds, including the construction of reference longevity indices, 
potential demand, pricing, liquidity and tax.53 
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